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The Use of Copyright Laws To Prevent the
Importation of "Genuine Goods"
James P. Donohue*
I. Introduction
United States subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign corporations'
and U.S. companies with foreign subsidiaries2 find their domestic
distribution networks increasingly threatened by the unauthorized
importation of goods substantially similar to the goods they market.
The imported goods are intended to be marketed abroad, but are
instead imported into the United States and sold in competition with
established U.S. distribution networks. This practice is referred to as
"parallel importation"3 or "diversion." ' 4 The imports, so-called
"genuine goods," 5 are often referred to as "grey market" goods. 6
The primary reason for the success of grey market distributors is
their ability to offer the same goods at prices lower than those de-
manded by U.S. distributors operating within established distribu-
* Partner, Merkel, Caine, Jory, Donohue & Duvall, Seattle, Washington. A.B. 1973,
University of Illinois; J.D. 1976, U.C.L.A.
I See, e.g., Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
2 See, e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
3 Parallel importation has been defined as "the importation of genuine goods by
someone other than the designated exclusive importer." Takamatsu, Parallel Importation of
Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 433 (1982). In Bell & Howell:
Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded,
719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), the court framed the issue as:
whether an American company, which is engaged in the business of import-
ing and selling trademarked goods of foreign manufacture under United
States trademark rights owned by it, may enjoin another's unauthorized,
competitive sale in the United States of the same identically marked trade-
marked goods, which were made and placed in the stream of international
commerce by the foreign manufacturer, who did not intend that such goods
be sold here.
Id. at 1064-65.
4 See, e.g., Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States,
598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
5 The term "genuine goods" means that the articles imported have the same origin
as the goods marketed in the United States. See Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the
Bureau of Ctstoms, 57 TRADE-MARK REP. 14. 15 (1967).
4; See, e.g., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1164. This article will refer to the U.S. trademark
or copyright owner as the "authorized distributor." "Grey market distributor" will refer
to the importer who imports "genuine goods" from abroad. "Genuine goods" have the
same origin, by manufacture or license, as those distributed by the authorized distributor.
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tion networks. 7 The reasons given for this price differential vary.
Those who defend unrestricted grey market sales contend that ab-
sent unauthorized imports, there is a total lack of intrabrand compe-
tition.8 This permits U.S. companies to establish higher prices than
those which would prevail with the unauthorized imports. 9 Con-
versely, authorized U.S. distributors contend that the price differen-
tial is explained by the following factors: (1) international currency
fluctuations vis-A-vis the currently strong U.S. dollar;' 0 (2) because
the "market" for the goods is established by authorized distributors,
grey market dealers have little, if any, promotional expense associ-
ated with their operations, and hence get a "free ride" on the efforts
of the authorized distributors;'' (3) little, if any, after-sale servicing
or warranty protection is offered by the grey market dealers;' 2 (4) au-
thorized dealers often must carry full product line inventory and pay
the associated costs of adequately servicing the line;' 3 and (5) au-
thorized U.S. distributors face higher costs from foreign manufactur-
ers for services offered to domestic consumers.14
Regardless of how the price differential is explained, one thing
is clear-parallel importation has been costly to U.S. businesses in
7 In W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), the court stated:
All operates in what has become known as the "gray market," in which legiti-
mately produced goods are imported without the authorization of the trade-
mark or copyright holder. A gray market is created when an arbitrageur
takes advantage of a price difference between two markets by buying in the
market where prices are lower and selling in the market where prices are
higher. The Hummel figures at issue here are genuine items produced by
Goebel; what Goebel seeks to challenge is All's unauthorized importation of
them into the country.
Id. at 764 n. 1. See also Richter, "Gray" Sales Cut Prices of Cameras, L.A. Times, Nov. 13, 1982,
at 1, col. I.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957),prob.juris.
noted sub. nom. Lanvin, Parfums, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S.
924, vacated and remanded sub noma. Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958),
dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
1) See, e.g., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166.
1o See, e.g., id.; see also Auerbach, The Gray Market: Vhere a $200 Watch Can Be Bought for
$140, Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1984, at LI, col. 1.
I I See, e.g., Viviltar, 593 F. Supp. at 435; Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 823, 831, disapproved by President Reagan pursuant to 19 USC. § 1337(g) (1982), 50
Fed. Reg. 1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 862, appeal dismissed sub. nom. Duracell, Inc.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Duracell].
12 No Guarantees for Guarantees in Gray Market, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1985, at 33, col. 2.
State legislatures have responded to the absence of guarantees. Legislation recently en-
acted in New York requires grey market goods retailers to inform consumers whether
goods have a warranty valid in the United States. Failure to comply can result in a fine not
to exceed $5,000, but the fact the retailer offers equal or greater warranty protection is a
defense. Assembly Bill No. 5971 (effective Oct. 22, 1985) (to be codified at N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Iaw § 21 8-aa).
I See, e.g-., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167.
14 Id. at 1167 n.3.
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terms of lost sales.' 5 Recently, affected businesses have begun to
fight back. Distributors owning trademarks on goods sold in the
United States are asserting their trademark rights to block unauthor-
ized importation of goods bearing the registered trademarks.' 6
Where imports have already reached the United States, trademark
owners are suing grey market distributors for infringement of their
marks. 1 7
The hopes of authorized distributors for judicial relief based on
trademark grounds were raised substantially in 1982 by Bell &
Howell. Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. 18 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York issued a preliminary in-
junction barring the unauthorized importation and sale of Mamiya
brand cameras. The U.S. distributor's victory was short lived. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit' 9 vacated the
injunction, holding that no irreparable harm had been shown, and
remanded the matter to the trial court. Since Bell & Howell, several
15 For example, it is estimated that one in four Seiko watches is sold through a grey
market dealer in the United States. Auerbach, supra note 10, at LI, col. 3. In addition,
15% to 20% of top quality camera equipment sold between 1982 and 1984 was sold on
the grey market. This is up from approximately five percent in 1979. Hughey, "Gray Mar-
ket" in Camera Imports Starts to Undercut Official Dealers, Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1982, at 29;
Richter, supra note 7. In Duracell the record showed that in 1983 10 million Belgian-made
Duracell batteries were imported for sale in competition with U.S. manufactured Duracell
batteries in the New York sales area alone, causing millions of dollars of lost sales. See 225
U.S.P.Q. at 838.
16 Such actions are based primarily upon a claimed violation of the Tariff Act of 1930,
ch. 497, § 526(a), 46 Stat. 590, 741 (1930) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a)
(1982)), which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful to
import into the United States, any merchandise of foreign manufacture if
such merchandise, or the label, sign, print, package, wrapper, or receptacle,
bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or association
created or organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent
and Trademark Office by a person domiciled in the United States, under the
provisions of sections 81 to 109 of title 15, and if a copy of the certificate of
registration of such trademark is filed with the Secretary of the Treasury, in
the manner provided in section 106 of said title 15, unless written consent of
the owner of such trademark is provided at the time of making entry.
17 Such actions are based primarily upon a claimed violation of § 42 of the Lanham
Act, ch. 540, § 42, 60 Stat. 440 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)),
and § 32(l)(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 11 14(1)(a). Section 42 provides in part:
"[N]o article of imported merchandise.., which shall copy or simulate a trademark regis-
tered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter ... shall be admitted to entry at any
customhouse of the United States." Section 32 provides in part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in con-
nection with such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive ...
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
18 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983).
19 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
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other decisions have been handed down and with two 20 or arguably
three2 exceptions, each has resulted in defeat for the U.S. trade-
mark owner seeking to block the parallel importation of so-called
genuine goods.22
Most authorized U.S. distributors affected by the grey market
have yet to discover the breadth of the U.S. Copyright Act 23 as a
means of redress. Section 60224 of the Copyright Act provides a
powerful weapon against grey market importation and distribution.
This article briefly discusses the rationale behind the decisions
denying relief to U.S. trademark owners. The article then turns to
the subject of why and how the copyright laws can provide the relief
sought, and identifies the risks and limitations associated with the
use of copyright law in such a manner.
II. Use of Trademarks To Block Grey Market Goods
In 1921 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit decided A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel,25 holding that the principle of
"universality" applied to trademarks. The court also stated that
trademarks were merely an indication of source of origin, and there
was no trademark infringement by goods that were properly marked
as to place of manufacture. Hence, no infringement occurred when
one U.S. company imported "genuine" face powder bearing the
French manufacturer's mark, despite sale by the manufacturer to an-
other U.S. company of its U.S. trademark and goodwill in the prod-
uct. The Second Circuit reasoned that "[i]f the goods sold are the
genuine goods covered by the trade-mark, the rights of the owner of
the trade-mark are not infringed."'26
In 1922 Congress enacted section 526 of the Tariff Act 2 7 to
overrule the decision of the Second Circuit. There was very little
debate on the measure.28
20 Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700 (D.NJ. 1985); Osawa, 589
F. Supp. at 1163.
21 Duracell was an action before the International Trade Commission challenging par-
allel importation as an unfair trade practice under § 337 of the TariffAct of 1930, ch. 497,
§ 337, 46 Stat. 590, 702 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)). The Commis-
sion concluded that grey market importation was an unfair practice. A Commission deter-
mination and ordered remedy is, however, subject to presidential disapproval "for public
policy reasons" pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 13 3 7 (g). The Commission decision was disap-
proved by President Reagan on January 5, 1985. See 225 U.S.P.Q. 862 (1985).
22 See infra notes 55, 60.
23 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1982).
24 Id. § 602.
25 275 F. 539 (Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
26 Id. at 543.,
27 Tariff Act of 1922, ch. 356, Pub. L. No. 318, 42 Stat. 858, 975 (1922).
28 When the bill was passed debate was limited to 10 minutes by floor vote. 62 CONG.
REc. 11,585, 11,602 (Aug. 19, 1922). Based on the bill's legislative record, some com-
mentators have found the legislative intent to be strongly supportive of restrictive impor-
tation. See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, The Competitive Process and Gray Market Goods, 5 N.Y.L. Scu. J.
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit
in Katzel.29 The Court framed the issue before it as follows: "There
is no question that the defendant infringes the plaintiff's rights un-
less the fact that her boxes and powder are the genuine product of
the French concern gives her a right to sell them in the present
form. "30
Without referencing the newly-adopted section 526, the Court
rejected the "universality" principle of trademark rights and adopted
the "territoriality" 3' concept of trademark rights. The territorality
concept provides that trademarks can indicate that the owner of the
mark is the source of the goods in a particular market and a guarantor
of the quality of those goods, even though he might not be the origi-
nal manufacturer. 32
In a case decided shortly thereafter, A. Bourjois & Co. Inc. v. Al-
dridge,33 the Supreme Court held that section 27 of the 1905 Trade-
mark Act, now codified at section 42 of the Lanham Act, 34 applied to
importation of "genuine goods." In neither Katzel nor Aldridge, how-
ever, was the U.S. trademark owner affiliated with the foreign origi-
nal source.
In 1957 in United States v. Guerlain35 the Justice Department
brought an antitrust action against three U.S. companies who were
using section 526 to bar importation of "genuine" perfume manu-
factured by affiliated foreign companies. In Guerlain the district court
found for the Government, holding that the defendants used section
526 to bar intraband competition, thereby monopolizing the sale of
their own products in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.3 6
While the appeal was before the Supreme Court,37 the Government
decided to seek legislation effectively adopting the trial court deci-
sion, and upon motion of the Solicitor General, the decision was va-
cated by the Supreme Court,38 and the case dismissed.3 9
INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 242 (1984); Note, Importation Control Under TariffAct, Section 526:
Trademark Privileges and Antitrust Policy, 67 YALE L.J. I110, 1111 n.2 (1958). But see, e.g.,
Dam, supra note 5, at 14. In Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit concluded that "the [floor] debate is too unfocused and misinformed to serve as a
definitive basis for interpretation of § 1526." Id. at 1563.
29 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
30 Id. at 691.
31 Id. at 692.
32 Id.
33 263 U.S. 675 (1923).
34 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
35 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. juris noted sub nom. Lanvin, Parfums, Inc. v.
United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924, vacated and remanded sub nora. Guer-
lain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed, 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
36 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
'7 355 U.S. 937 (1958) (noting probable jurisdiction).
3' 358 U.S. 915 (1958).
39- 172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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Legislation to change section 526 was introduced40 to deny U.S.
companies import protection against genuine goods manufactured
and sold by related companies. The proposed legislation, however,
was never enacted. It is with this background that recent trademark-
based challenges to grey market distribution have taken place.
The function of a trademark is "to designate the goods as the
product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against the
sale of another's product as his." '4 1 The legal protection given trade-
marks, however, is closely related to the functions they serve, and the
distinction between "how a trademark operates and why it should be
protected is often blurred by the courts."'42
These distinctions are not only blurred by the courts but by
commentators 43 as well. The use of trademarks to block parallel im-
portation has been applauded by some authors 44 and condemned by
40 H.R. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). This bill would have repealed § 42 of the
Lanham Act by striking it and substituting provisions that would bar importation of coun-
terfeit goods. The bill provided that Lanham Act remedies against trademark
infringement
shall not be available against an importer or seller of goods bearing a mark
registered to an agent, authorized distributor, or subsidiary of, or to a person
who is affiliated with or controlled by, a foreign manufacturer or merchant
who uses the registered mark to identify and distinguish his goods.
Id.
41 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
42 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03 (1984). Gilson identi-
fies the function of a trademark as:
(1) designation of "source or origin of a particular product or service...;"
(2) denoting "a particular standard of quality ... embodied in the product
or service;"
(3) identification of "a product or service [distinguishing] it from the prod-
ucts or services of others;"
(4) a symbol of the goodwill of the owner;
(5) a representation of "a substantial advertising investment [which] is
treated as a species of property; or"
(6) a protection for "the public from confusion and deception, [ensuring
consumers] are able to purchase the products and services they want and [a
device to] enable courts to fashion a standard of acceptable business
conduct."
Id. See also 3A R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPO-
LIES § 21.06 (4th ed. 1983), in which the author identifies "three distinct and separate
purposes" for a trademark: "(1) It identifies the product and its origin, (2) it guarantees
the product's unchanged quality, and (3) it advertises the product."
43 Using the term "genuine goods" to describe grey market goods, or those coming
from the same manufacturer as those marketed in the United States, causes part of the
confusion. Because the grey market goods were not intended for sale in the United States,
they may not be identical to those sold by the authorized distributor-and therefore not
"genuine." This may be because differences in quality standards result in slight alterations
in the goods, or because different post-sale servicing and warranty services may be appro-
priate. See O'Brien, Can )'our Trademark Be Used To Stop Importation of Your Licensee's Product,
I A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 255, 264-65 (1980).
See also Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1172-73.
44 See, e.g., J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16.16B (2d ed.
1984); Callman, Another Look at the Unlawful Importation of Trademarked Articles, 52 TRADE-
MARK REP. 556, 561 (1962); Derenberg, Current Trademark Problems in Foreign Travel and
Import Trade, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 674, 681 (1959). See also Nolan-Haley, supra note 28.
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others.45 Indeed, even the U.S. Government has taken inconsistent
positions on the issue.46
U.S. trademark owners seeking relief have taken the position
that the language contained in section 526 of the Tariff Act 4 7 and
section 42 of the Lanham Act 48 is unequivocal, 49 and that the best
means to determine congressional intent on the issue is to look di-
rectly to the statutes. 50 Courts sustaining the position of the trade-
mark owners5' have done so on the basis of the language of the
statutes and the concept that trademarks are territorial rather than
universal in scope, that is, a trademark has a separate legal existence
under each country's laws.
5 2
45 See, e.g., Callman, Unfair Competition with Imported Trade-Marked Goods, 43 VA. L. REV.
323 (1957); Note, Preventing the Importation and Sale of Genuine Goods Bearing American-Owned
Trademarks: Protecting an American Goodwill, 35 ME. L. REv. 315 (1983); Note, Trademark
Infringement: The Power of an American Trademark Owner To Prevent the Importation of the Authen-
tic Product Manufactured by a Foreign Country, 64 YALE L.J. 557 (1955).
46 In Bell & Howell the United States filed an amicus brief supporting the position of
the U.S. trademark owner. Justice Department Brief, Bell & Howell: Mamiya v. Masel
Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). It has taken the opposite position in two subse-
quent cases, however, representing the United States Customs Service in actions challeng-
ing the validity of Customs regulations (19 C.F.R. § 133.31 (1985)) that permit the entry
of grey market goods. See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 420; Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 844. The
International Trade Commission noted the about face in Duracell, an action challenging
parallel importation as an unfair method of competition under § 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). Vice Chairman Liebler noted: "Unlike the court in Vivitar
Corp. v. United States, I cannot ignore the brief filed by the Chief Counsel of the U.S.
Customs Service and the Department of Justice in the Second Circuit in Bell & Howell:
Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co." Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 842.
47 See supra note 16.
48 See supra note 17.
49 See, e.g., Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1175; Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1076.
50 The United States Customs Service and the justice Department, in its amicus brief,
advanced this argument in Mamiya's appeal to the Second Circuit:
Here, nothing in the language of § 32 or § 42 of the Lanham Act, or in the
language of § 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 526, which affords ad-
ditional remedies to U.S. trademark holders, expressly limits the exclusion-
ary rights conferred to U.S. firms that are independent of owners of identical
foreign marks. Rather, the relevant language purports to confer the exclu-
sionary rights awarded to all owners of U.S. trademarks who satisfy the other
requirements of the provisions. Since the statutory language contains no
ambiguity on this point, only the clearest expression of a contrary intent in
the legislative history would warrant departing from the normal meaning of
the language employed by Congress. See CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980). But neither the legislative reports nor the congressional
debate contain any clear evidence of a legislative intent to deny trademark
protection where the owner of the U.S. mark is owned or controlled by the
foreign manufacturer of the trademarked goods.
Justice Department Brief at 7-8, Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 42.
51 Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1063; Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1163; Duracell, 225
U.S.P.Q. at 823; Weil Ceramics, 618 F. Supp. at 700; cf A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S.
689 (1923); Model Rectifier Corp. v. Takachiho Int'l, Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 502 (9th
Cir. 1983).
52 For example, in Osawa, the court stated the universality principle has faded and
been generally supplanted by the
principle of"territoriality," upon which the Bourjois rulings were based. This
principle recognizes that a trademark has a separate legal existence under
each country's laws, and that its proper lawful function is not necessarily to
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The argument that trademark laws cannot be used to block par-
allel importation is as follows: because there is no property in a
trademark separate from the goodwill it represents,5 3 when an au-
thorized U.S. distributor neither cultivates a public perception of it-
self as the original source nor maintains significant controls over the
use of the mark, goodwill does not exist apart from the foreign man-
ufacturer or owner of the rights. 54 Courts rejecting the use of trade-
marks to block grey market goods have held that because the grey
market goods are "genuine goods" (meaning they come from the
same manufacturing source), there is no confusion as to the source
by ultimate users. 55 These courts focus on one of the functions of
the trademark,56 but ignore others. 57
Current U.S. Customs regulations provide little assistance to the
domestic trademark owner. 58 While one court has opined in dictum
specify the origin or manufacture of a good (although it may incidentally do
that), but rather to symbolize the domestic goodwill of the domestic
marketholder so that the consuming public may rely with an expectation of
consistency on the domestic reputation earned for the mark by its owner, and
the owner of the mark may be confident that this goodwill and reputation
(the value of his mark) will not be injured through use of the mark by others
in domestic commerce.
589 F. Supp. at 1171-72. See also Weil Ceramics, 618 F. Supp. at 705-06. The concept of
territoriality of trademarks is also recognized by article 6(3) of the International Conven-
tion for Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention), which provides in part: "A
mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks
registered in other countries of the Union, including the country of origin." The United
States is a signatory and a member of the Paris Convention, which elevates this treaty to
the force of law. See Davidson Extension S.A. v. Davidoff Int'l Inc., 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
465, 467 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
53 See United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at 97.
54 Note, supra note 45, at 337.
55 See, e.g., Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 46 (dicta); El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe
World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380, 1399 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States
Customs Serv., 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983); Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 82. Cf Monte
Carlo Shirt Co. v. Daewoo Int'l (Am.) Corp., 707 F.2d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1983) (buyer
confusion as to source of goods is element of cause of action for trademark infringement);
DEP Corp. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 622 F.2d 621, 622 n.l (2d Cir. 1980) (distributor of
goods which has no property interest -in trademark lacks standing to bring trademark in-
fringement action).
56 See supra note 42.
57 Two of the functions are to denote a standard of quality and to recognize a sub-
stantial advertising investment as a species of property. See supra note 42. Grey market
goods frequently are associated with a lack of post-sale servicing and warranties, which
could impair the standard of quality that the U.S. trademark owners seek to establish. See
supra note 12. In addition, the grey market distributor engages in little, if any, promo-
tional activity. See generally Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 829-31. As Rudolf Callman noted:
The proposition that a trademark owner can exclude others from only a use
which causes confusion is based upon the fallacious premise that the guaran-
tee function is the most significant of the three trademark functions. The
courts have been somewhat unmindful of the manifold functions of the
trademark and have failed to realize its value as something more than a mere
symbol of goodwill .... The trademark owner, however, should be entitled
to protection with respect to any form of trademark use.
3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 42, § 17.07, at 32.
58 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985) provides in relevant part:
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that the current Customs regulations are ultra vires, given the unam-
biguous language of section 526 of the Tariff Act,59 other courts
considering the issue have directly upheld the reasonableness of the
regulations. 60 The Customs Service is conducting an ongoing in-
quiry into grey market trade practices, 6' but has yet to post formal
notice of regulation changes for comment.
In Vivitar Corp. v. United States62 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit considered the validity of Customs reg-
ulations in an appeal from the Court of International Trade. Vivitar
sought to force the Customs Service to bar importation of any for-
eign manufactured photographic equipment bearing the registered
trademark VIVITAR®. The court held that the regulations did not
define the limits of protection afforded a U.S. trademark owner, but
were a reasonable exercise of Customs power, leaving to the courts
the determination whether the goods should be excluded in a given
grey market fact situation, and permitting Customs to enforce the
court's decision. 63
The Vivitar court in dictum, however, approved the use of sec-
tion 526 as a means of providing relief to private parties affected by
grey market importation. The court held that the language of sec-
tion 526(a) evidenced an intent to provide an exclusion remedy
broader than that of 15 U.S.C. section 1124, because section 526(a)
was not limited by the words "copy or simulate" contained in section
1124, and because section 526(c) provides a private cause of action
for the same damages as those provided for in trademark infringe-
ment cases. 64 Hence, the court reasoned that the reach of section
(b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical
with one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or
association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure
and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
(c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by
the same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or control (see
§§ 133.2(d) and 133.12(d));
(3) The articles of foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or
trade name applied under authorization of the U.S. owner.
Id. (Emphasis added).
Common ownership and common control are defined as follows:
(1) "Common ownership" means individual or aggregate ownership of
more than 50 percent of the business entity; and
(2) "Common control" means effective control in policy and opera-
tions and is not necessarily synonymous with common ownership.
Id. § 133.2(d).
59 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177.
6o See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848-52; Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 433-36.
61 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984).
62 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
63 Id. at 1569.
64 Id. at 1563-64.
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526 had to be broader than section 1124 because a private damage
remedy was already available for typical trademark infringement
cases. Judge Davis, although concurring in the result, criticized his
colleagues for delving into a discussion of the availability of section
526 to private parties, since the appeal related to the Customs Ser-
vice and not private parties.65
In sum, the use of trademarks to block parallel importation is
often unavailable to the authorized U.S. distributor. Courts applying
traditional trademark principles to the issues posed by the grey mar-
ket have been hostile to the trademark owner, primarily because of
blurred distinctions as to the appropriate functions of trademarks.
Attorneys contemplating section 337 actions before the Interna-
tional Trade Commission are faced with the possibility of presiden-
tial disapproval of findings in favor of the trademark owner. 66
Section 526 holds some promise, but is also uncertain because the
strongest appellate court opinion supporting such a claim is dic-
tum.6 7 It is because of the uncertainty of trademark protection that
distributors should look to copyright law for assistance. Because of
the fundamental differences between trademarks and copyrights, the
same problems faced by trademark owners do not exist for copyright
owners seeking to block the entry of grey market goods.
III. Use of Copyright To Block Grey Market Goods
A. The Purpose of Copyright Laws
Unlike trademark laws which are of common law origin, 68 the
government grant of authority to regulate copyright comes directly
from the Constitution. 69 The principal purpose of copyright is not
to reward the author, sometimes referred to as a secondary consider-
ation, 70 but rather to advance the public welfare by encouraging the
65 Id. at 1572.
66 Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862.
67 Indeed, one court has already refused to follow the dictum of the court of appeals
in Vivitar, believing the lower court reasoning to be more persuasive. See Olympus Corp.
v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986).
68 See, e.g., Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); 3A R. CALLMAN, supra note 42,
§ 25.03.
69 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 provides: "The Congress shall have the power to
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their discoveries ......
70 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
Despite what is said in some authorities that the author's interest in securing
an economic reward for his labors is "a secondary consideration," it is clear
that the real purpose of the copyright scheme is to encourage works of the
intellect, and that this purpose is to be achieved by reliance on the economic
incentives granted to authors and inventors by the copyright scheme. This
scheme relies on the author to promote the progress of science by permitting
him to control the cost of and access to his novelty.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 1981), revd, 104 S.
Ct. 774 (1984).
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efforts of authors.71 The cases recognize, however, that it is difficult
to distinguish this purpose of copyright from the recognition that the
rewarding of the author is the means by which to accomplish the pur-
pose. For example, in Mazer v. Stein,72 the Court held that "the eco-
nomic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of indi-
vidual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
Useful Arts.' 73
When these purposes are contrasted with the primary purpose
of the trademark, which is the designation of the source of origin of
goods, 74 it becomes clear that, at least as far as parallel importation
is concerned, trademark decisions should have no bearing on the use
of the copyright laws to block grey market goods. 75 The trademark
cases which deny relief have focused on the claim that because the
grey market goods are "genuine goods," there is no confusion as to
their source. 76 This consideration is irrelevant for purposes of copy-
right analysis.
B. Section 602 and the First Sale Doctrine
The ability of the copyright owner to block unauthorized im-
ports arises from section 602 of the Copyright Act. 77 Section 602(a)
provides:
Importation into the United States, without the authority of the
owner of the copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of
a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an in-
fringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or pho-
norecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.
Section 602(b) provides in part:
In a case where the making of copies or phonorecords would have
constituted an infringement if this title had been applicable, their
importation is prohibited. In a case where the copies or pho-
norecords were lawfully made, the United States Customs Service
has no authority to prevent their importation unless the provisions
of Section 601 are applicable. In either case, the Secretary of Treas-
ury is authorized to prescribe, by regulation, a procedure under
which any person claiming an interest in the copyright in a particular
work may . . . be entitled to notification by the Customs Service of
the importation of articles that appear to be copies or phonorecords
71 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (1985).
72 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
73 Id. at 219.
74 J. GILSON, supra note 42, § 1.03.
7. The Supreme Court has indicated that while patent and copyright matters are simi-
lar, there is a distinction between copyright and trademark law. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, 104 S. Ct. 774, 787 n. 19 (1984); United Drug Co., 248 U.S. at
97 (trademark rights have "little or no analogy" to copyright matters).
76 See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
77 17 U.S.C. § 602 (1982).
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of the work. 78
The plain language of the statute, therefore, makes it clear that
unauthorized importation constitutes a violation of the exclusive
right to distribute copies accorded to the copyright owner under sec-
tion 106(3). 79 If it were otherwise, there would be no reason for
section 602(b) to deal with a situation in which copies "were lawfully
made" abroad. The only question raised about such a conclusion is
that posed by the first sale doctrine, embodied in section 109(a) of
the Act,8 0 which specifically limits the copyright owner's distribution
rights under section 106(3). These distribution rights are referenced
in section 602(a).
The first sale doctrine recognizes the right of the copyright
owner to exercise his distribution rights with respect to the initial
sale. Thereafter, however, the copyright owner loses his ability to
use the copyright laws to prevent or restrict resale or subsequent
transfer.8 1
The first sale doctrine comes into play in the case of parallel
importation if the initial sale by a foreign source (either the original
manufacturer or the foreign licensee of a U.S. licensor) in a foreign
market was treated as a valid first sale of the work for the purposes of
the statute. Any subsequent sale would be taken out of the reach of
the Copyright Act, particularly section 602, thereby preventing the
U.S. copyright owner from blocking importation and distribution in
the United States through use of the copyright laws.
The legislative history8 2 accompanying the Copyright Act, how-
ever, makes it clear that the first sale doctrine has no application to
78 Section 602 provides three exceptions: (1) importation under authority or for use
of government, excluding schools; (2) importation for private use of importer and distri-
bution of no more than one copy of a work at any one time; and (3) limited importation by
organizations operated for scholarly, educational, or religious purposes. See id.
79 Section 106(3) provides: "Subject to sections107 through 118, the owner of copyright
under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: ...
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending." Id. § 106(3) (emphasis
added).
8o Section 109(a) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular
copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized
by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
Id. § 109(a).
81 The copyright owner may have other claims against a transferee who subsequently
transfers a copy in breach of a contractual provision restricting transfer, but not under the
copyright laws. See, e.g., Lantern Press, Inc. v. American Publishers Co., 419 F. Supp. 1267
(E.D.N.Y. 1976) (no copyright infringement when one who purchased paperback copies
from unauthorized distributor rebinds and sells them in hard cover, even though such
rights were reserved to copyright owner). See generally 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 71,
§ 8.12[B].
82 S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659.
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cases involving unauthorized importation of copyrighted works. In
discussing section 602, the House Report states:
Section 602 . . . deals with two separate situations: importation of
"piratical" articles (that is, copies or phonorecords made without
any authorization of the copyright owner), and unauthorized impor-
tation of copies or phonorecords that were lawfully made. The gen-
eral approach of section 602 is to make unauthorized importation an
act of infringement, in both cases, but to permit the Bureau of Cus-
toms to prohibit importation only of "piratical" articles. 8 3
To eliminate any question that the section would apply to works in
the international stream of commerce, the House Report continued:
The second situation covered by section 602 is that where the copies
of phonorecords were lawfully made but their distribution in the
United States would infringe the U.S. copyright owner's exclusive
rights. As already said, the mere act of importation in this situation
would constitute an act of infringement and could be enjoined.8 4
Prior to the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, there
was no basis for copyright owners to prevent importation of their
work into the United States-copyright owners could only prevent
importation of "piratical copies."'8 5 At the outset, the drafters of the
Copyright Act of 1976 did not deal with prevention of importation,
believing that copyright laws should not be used to enforce contrac-
tual obligations and rights of parties. This view, however, did not
prevail. 86 The phrase "lawfully made" which appears in section 602
appears to have derived from the report of the Register of Copy-
rights on the 1965 Revision Bill. 8 7 This report cited as an example
of the applicability of section 602 a scenario "where the copyright
owner had authorized the making of copies in a foreign country for
distribution only in that country."'88
Thus, the import of the language in section 60289 and its legisla-
83 H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 82, at 169 (emphasis added).
84 Id. at 170. The Senate Report also stated that § 602(a):
first states the general rule that unauthorized importation is an infringement
merely if the copies of phonorecords "have been acquired abroad, but then
enumerates three specific exemptions .... If none of the exemptions ap-
plies, any unauthorized importer of copies or phonorecords acquired abroad
could be sued for damages and enjoined from making any use of them, even
before any public distribution in this country has taken place."
S. REP. No. 473, supra note 82, at 151-52. See also H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 82, at
169.
85 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
8(6 See generally Note, Parallel Importing Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 113, 134-37 (1984).
87 Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of
the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965 Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 148-50 (1965).
88 Id. at 150.
89 In addition, § 501 of the Act separates the unauthorized importation provisions of
§ 602 of the Act from the grants and restrictions provisions set forth in §§ 106-118 of the
Act. Section 501(a) defines an infringer as "anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner as provided by § 106 through § 118, or who imports copies
or phonorecords into the United States in violation of § 602 .... " 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1982)
(emphasis added).
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tive history makes it clear that the first sale doctrine has no impact in
cases of unauthorized importation.90
This conclusion is in accord with the case law interpreting sec-
tion 602. In Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Elcon Industries, Inc.9 1 plaintiff
brought an action for copyright and trademark infringement and un-
fair competition against defendants, distributors of the video game
"Crazy Kong," which plaintiff alleged infringed its rights in "Donkey
Kong." Plaintiff was a corporation organized under the law of the
State of Washington, but was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japa-
nese corporation, Nintendo Co. Ltd. 92 The Japanese parent corpo-
ration assigned the rights to the U.S. copyright in the video game to
its U.S. subsidiary.9 3 Subsequently, the parent corporation licensed
a Japanese company to make copies under the name Crazy Kong, but
limited sales to Japan.9 4 When Crazy Kong games found their way
into the United States, the U.S. subsidiary sought to enjoin the distri-
bution of the games, alleging a violation of its distribution rights
under section 106(3) of the copyright law.
Defendant argued, among other things, that the licensing in Ja-
pan by the parent company acted as a first sale. Defendant reasoned
that once the infringing games appeared in the United States, the
Japanese parent could have an action for breach of contract against
its Japanese licensee, but the U.S. subsidiary could not maintain an
action for copyright infringement. The court disagreed. It held that
the copyright was owned by the U.S. subsidiary who had not licensed
the production of the infringing games in Japan or authorized the
importation of the games into the United States. Hence, importation
itself was an infringement of the subsidiary's copyright. 95
The same result was reached in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc. 96 In Scorpio a Japanese corporation,
CBS-Sony, entered into an agreement with a Philippines company,
granting to that company the right to manufacture and distribute
copyrighted musical recordings exclusively in the Philippines. Plain-
tiff (CBS (U.S.)), owner of the U.S. copyright, consented to the li-
cense. The license was later terminated, and the licensee was given
sixty days to sell its inventory to another Philippines corporation. A
sale was consummated, and the second Philippines corporation then
sold the phonorecords to a U.S. importer, which in turn consigned
9( This is also Professor Nimmer's conclusion. See 2 M. NIMMER, snpra note 71,
§ 8.12[B][6].
91 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
92 Id. at 939.
9:. Id. at 940.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 943-44.
9.) 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), (!fd, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the shipment to defendant. CBS (U.S.) brought an action against the
defendant consignee.
Defendant argued that the records were reproduced pursuant to
a valid licensing agreement and were subject to a valid transfer be-
tween the two Philippine corporations; as a result, a first sale took
place. The court held that section 602 was not subject to the limita-
tions of the first sale defense in section 109. The qualifying phrase
in section 109-"lawfully made under this title"-applied only to
copies "legally manufactured and sold within the United States and
not to purchasers of imports . . . .97
The court noted that to construe section 109(a) as superseding
section 602 would render section 602 meaningless. "Third party
purchasers who import phonorecords could thereby circumvent the
statute, in every instance, by simply buying the recordings indi-
rectly." 98 The court concluded that section 602, as applied to the
facts, made Scorpio a copyright infringer as a matter of law. 99
In Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp'00 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of Florida granted the U.S. copy-
right and trademark owner's motion for summary judgment and
enjoined defendants from importing Trivial Pursuit games from
Canada and distributing these games in the United States. The court
held that section 602(a) prohibited "importation without consent of
the copyright owner into the U.S. of copies or phonorecords of a
work acquired outside the U.S. and defines such action as an in-
fringement of the exclusive right to distribute."' 0'1 The court in
Selchow & Righter did not, however, specifically deal with the first sale
doctrine in its analysis.
Neither Nintendo nor Scorpio answers all questions concerning the
scope of section 602 on the issue of blocking grey market products in
a parent/subsidiary or affiliate relationship. For example, discussing
section 602, the Nintendo court noted that neither the U.S. subsidiary
which owned the copyright nor its parent consented to the importa-
tion into the United States of the games licensed in Japan.' 0 2 It
97 Id. at 49.
98 Id.
' Id. at 50. The court also rejected the defendant's argument that it was not the
importer for purposes of § 602 liability. The defendant ordered the phonorecords from
another U.S. importer. The court held that Scorpio was a contributory and vicarious in-
fringer, and that its alleged unawareness of the infringement would not insulate it from
liability, but could only reduce its damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). Id. at 48 n.5.
i(1 612 F. Supp. 19 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
10i Id. at 25 n.7.
102 Although defendants contend that the Crazy Kong games do not infringe
on the plaintiff's copyright because the games were distributed in the United
States under the licensing agreement between Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Fal-
con, Inc., the licensing agreement clearly prohibited Falcon, Inc. from im-
porting or exporting Donkey Kong or Crazy Kong printed circuit boards into
the United States. There is no evidence to show that either plaintiff or
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could be argued that had there been no contract between the Japa-
nese parent and the Japanese licensee limiting the distribution of the
infringing games to Japan, the unauthorized importation would be
subject to the first sale defense. This conclusion is not warranted,
however, because the existence of a valid first sale is not dependent
on whether a contract is in existence or has been breached.10 3
Hence, the inclusion of references to the consent or lack of consent
of the Japanese parent by the court in Nintendo must be read as gratu-
itous to the section 602 analysis.
Similarly, Scorpio does not set forth the specific relationship be-
tween the Japanese corporation which granted the initial license
(CBS-Sony, Inc.) and the corporation owning the U.S. copyright
(CBS (U.S.)). In the absence of a parent/subsidiary or affiliate rela-
tionship, it might be argued that the case does not settle the issue
whether a sale by a foreign parent would act as a first sale to bar
section 602 relief to a U.S. subsidiary. The exact nature of the rela-
tionship in this case, however, was irrelevant. Plaintiff consented to
the Philippine licensing arrangement which ultimately produced the
phonorecords in question. Consent to activities abroad, however,
did not alter the court's decision. The court held that the language
of section 602 is clear, and with any other reading of section 602,
"[t]he copyright owner would be unable to exercise control over
copies of the work which entered the American market in competi-
tion with copies lawfully manufactured and distributed under this ti-
tle."'10 4 The purpose of section 602, the court concluded, was to
place restrictions "on the importation of phonorecords in order that
the rights of United States copyright owners can be preserved." 05 Thus,
the decision reached by the court in Scorpio would be the same re-
gardless of the relationship between the U.S. copyright owner and
the foreign manufacturer/licensor.
Nevertheless, in Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enterprises, Inc. 106 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held
that section 602 could not be used to block the re-entry of Lauren
POLO fragrances and cosmetics into the United States when the cos-
metics were manufactured in the United States and initially sold to a
U.S. company for export. In Cosmair the court held that the first sale
doctrine limited the scope of section 602 where the initial sale oc-
curred in the United States. Moreover, injunctive relief was denied
due to questions concerning the validity of plaintiff's copyrights.
Nintendo Co., Ltd. ever authorized anyone to import Crazy Kong games into
the United States.
564 F. Supp. at 944.
1 ()3 See supra note 81.
104 Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49.
145 Id. at 50 (emphasis added).
i() 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
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In summary, section 602 is an appropriate tool to block unau-
thorized imports which are subject to copyright protection, notwith-
standing the relationship between the U.S. copyright owner and the
foreign manufacturing source. 10 7 Customs copyright regulations t1
in effect trace the Customs trademark regulations 0 9 on this issue.
Unlike the case of trademark regulations, however, there is clear con-
gressional direction to the Customs Service to promulgate copyright
regulations treating grey market goods differently from piratical cop-
ies. 110 Although Customs may not block the entry of the grey market
goods, the U.S. copyright owner has the ability to proceed with a
private infringement action pursuant to section 602.
C. Availability of Copyright Protection
While section 602 can provide substantial relief from grey mar-
ket importation of traditional forms of authorship-such as books,
records, and movies-it is not so limited in scope. Rather, the bene-
fits of section 602 can accrue to distributors of a number of other
goods, if manufacturers and/or their authorized distributors seek
copyright protection of the goods.
To be copyrightable, works must be "original works of author-
ship"' II and fall within one of seven categories." 2 The work, how-
ever, must not be merely "an idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work."' 1 3
Practically all goods for general distribution have some feature
107 The conclusion that unauthorized importation is not subject to the first sale doc-
trine is supported by analogies to other areas of intellectual property. See, e.g., Griffin v.
Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re Reclosable
Plastic Bags, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 674 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1977); Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite
Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 259 (C.C.P.A. 1930); cf Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890) (pat-
ents). See supra note 75 for the distinction between copyright and patent matters, and
copyright and trademark law. The scope of import protection under the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. I 1984), is unclear. The owner
of a mask work is given the exclusive right to import or distribute a semiconductor chip
under 17 U.S.C. § 905, but this right is subject to a first sale limitation under 17 U.S.C.
§ 906(b).
108 19 C.F.R. § 133.32(c) (1985) requires the copyright owner recording its copyright
with the Customs Service to identify each person authorized or licensed to use the
copyright.
109 See supra note 58.
1 10 See 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1982).
III Id. § 102(a).
112 Section 102(a) states that works of authorship include the following categories of
works:
(I) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; and (7) sound recordings. Id.
113 Id. § 102(b).
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that is capable of receiving copyright protection. For example, many,
goods have features that would qualify them as "pictorial" or
"graphic" works under section 102(a)(5). These works are defined
in the Act to "include two-dimensional . ..works of fine, graphic,
and applied art . . . . "114 The legislative history of section
102(a)(5)115 states that the definition was intended to include every-
thing in section 5(0 through 5(k) of the 1909 statute." 16 Section 5(k)
of the former Act, which covered "prints and pictorial illustrations"
included "prints or labels used for articles of merchandise" in its
scope. This coverage was carried over to the new Act.' 1 7
A label, in this context, is generally understood to refer to artis-
tic and/or literary work imprinted or attached to an article of mer-
chandise.' 18 While brand names and trade names themselves may
not be copyrightable," t9 pictorial illustrations and designs are. 120
Examples of copyrightable aspects other than labels include
items such as advertisements on containers,121 color schemes,122 in-
structional booklets, 123 and assembly plans.124 There are, of course,
limitations on those seeking copyrights, including the requirements
that the work be original' 25 and that the work have more than a utili-
tarian function. 126
The impact of potential copyright infringement actions on the
distribution of grey market goods could be substantial. Although the
''4 Id. § 101.
115 S. REP. No. 473, supra note 82, at 53. While the subsequent House Report, supra
note 82, did not contain the same language, Professor Nimmer believes that the omission
has no substantive significance. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 71, § 2.08.
116 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976).
117 The Committee Report states: "There is no intention whatsoever to narrow the
scope of the subject matter now characterized in section 5(k) as 'prints or labels used for
articles of merchandise.' " S. REP. No. 473, supra note 82, at 53.
118 See I M. NIMMER, supra note 71, § 2.08[G][1].
'19 See Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andreas Dumon, Inc., 466 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1972);
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. v. Nifty Foods Corp., 226 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally I
M. NiMMER, supra note 71, § 2.08[G][l]-[2].
120 See Drop Dead Co. v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 326 F.2d 87 (9th Cir. 1963); Abli,
Inc. v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 323 F. Supp. 1400 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
121 See Lin-Brook Builders Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965) (cata-
logue cover); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nationwide Indept. Directory Serv., Inc., 371
F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (telephone directory).
122 See Primcot Fabrics v. Kleinfab Corp., 368 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
123 Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 132 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 30 (N.D. I11. 1961),
aff'd, 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963); but see Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game
Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675
(1st Cir. 1967).
124 Aitken v. Empire Constr. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).
1'' 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
126 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879). In Baker the Court first decided that works
whose function was solely or primarily utilitarian would be denied copyright protection.
The work in question was a new system of bookkeeping with forms. After Baker some
courts have held that blank forms intended to record rather than communicate facts are
not copyrightable. See, e.g., Time-Save Check, Inc. v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 178
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 510 (N.D. Tex. 1973); seegenerally I M. NIMMER, supra note 71, § 2.181B1.
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Customs Service would be unable to block the parallel importation
of these goods, 127 authorized distributors who own the U.S. copy-
rights would be able to bring actions under section 602 to enjoin the
distribution of grey market products which are copies or that contain
infringing material in violation of their exclusive distribution rights
under section 106(3). This could force grey market distributors to
take dramatic steps to avoid infringement problems, such as repack-
aging or relabeling the goods or providing different instructional or
assembly materials. Additional handling or advertising costs associ-
ated with repackaging or relabeling could, with some commodities,
eliminate the price differential between the goods sold by authorized
U.S. distributors and grey market distributors, thus eliminating the
economic incentives underlying grey market activities.
D. Antitrust Concerns
The limited monopoly rights conferred by the grant of copyright
can be abused in ways which violate the antitrust laws.' 28 The pri-
mary antitrust concern of a copyright owner using section 602 to
block importation of goods of related companies would be a poten-
tial claim of conspiracy to divide international markets1 29 in violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.130 Since the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,131 however, this
should not be a significant problem as it concerned relationships be-
tween parent corporations and their wholly owned subsidiaries.
In W Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Industries, Inc. 132 plaintiff
owner of the U.S. copyrights in Hummel figures brought a copyright
infringement action against a grey market importer under section
602. At issue was the copyright owner's motion to dismiss the anti-
trust counterclaims of the grey market importer. The holder of the
U.S. copyright was a West German limited partnership that manufac-
tured the Hummel figures. The grey market importer purchased the
goods from plaintiff's authorized dealers in Europe and imported
them into the United States without consent of the U.S. copyright
owner.
Defendants argued that plaintiff was attempting to use the copy-
rights to limit the quantity of Hummel figures being imported into
127 See supra note 108.
128 United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (blanket licensing is not price fixing per se
unlawful under antitrust laws).
129 See, e.g., Parfums Stern, 575 F. Supp. at 416; Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 77; cf. F.
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (agreements between
legally separate companies to suppress competition and to aggregate trade restraints vio-
late Sherman Act).
1: 0 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
I:1 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984).
32 589 F. Supp. 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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the United States, thereby keeping prices artificially high. This con-
duct, they maintained, amounted to copyright misuse, thereby strip-
ping the plaintiff of the antitrust immunity it would otherwise have
by virtue of the copyright laws. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that defendant lacked stand-
ing to assert the counterclaims, because defendants were not pur-
chasers. As to the defendants' claim that the infringement suit filed
by the copyright owner was an act in furtherance of a conspiracy, the
court concluded "[g]iven the direct language of Section 602 of the
copyright laws, . . . AII's claim that Goebel's suit was part of an anti-
trust conspiracy must also be dismissed."' 33
A second potential antitrust concern is that exclusion of grey
market goods could constitute monopolization or an attempt to mo-
nopolize the copyrighted goods in violation of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. 134 Any such contention, however, would require a very
narrow relevant market consisting of only the copyrighted articles
themselves. To succeed, a grey market distributor would have to
show a lack of interbrand competition as well as a lack of intrabrand
competition. 135 Such a showing would be difficult. Other antitrust
concerns have been raised,' 36 but as one commentator noted with
respect to the antitrust concerns facing trademark owners seeking to
block parallel importation:
[D]espite all of the antitrust arrows thrown in the gray market area,
the antitrust issues seem to be of only secondary importance. The
basic issue remains one of trademark rights and its resolution will
not turn fundamentally on the antitrust considerations being
raised. 137
E. Limitations on the Use of Copyright
The copyright laws are not a panacea for all problems faced by
U.S. distributors. Apart from antitrust concerns, there are several
limitations on copyright protection. For example, all works for
which copyright protection is sought must carry an appropriate copy-
right notice.' 38 This might require new packaging and instructional
material if substantial numbers of copies of the work have been dis-
133 Id. at 767; see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Grenada Electronics, Inc.,
229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
134 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
135 See, e.g., Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 77. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court stated that interbrand competition and not intrabrand
competition "is the primary concern of the antitrust law." Id. at 51 n.19. An exclusive
distribution contract that limits or eliminates intrabrand competition can enhance con-
sumer welfare by increasing interbrand competition. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 28, at 233.
136 Victor, Preventing Importation of Products in Viotation of Property Rights, 53 ANTITRUST
L.J. 783, 801 (1984). See also Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 840-41.
137 See Victor, supra note 136, at 802.
138 17 U.S.C. § 401 (1982).
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tributed without the required notice. 139
Additionally, in the event of infringement, if a substantial por-
tion of the profits from the sale of grey market goods are not derived
from that portion of the goods that are copyrighted, damages can be
limited. The infringer is entitled to a remission of any damage award
in the amount of revenues not associated with infringement. 140
Hence, as a practical matter, other than injunctive relief,14' a copy-
right owner's remedy may be limited to statutory damages amount-
ing to as little as one hundred dollars.' 42 Moreover, because the
manufacturing clause' 43 remains a part of the copyright law, copy-
right protection for printed material could be lost if the printing oc-
curs outside the United States.
IV. Conclusion
Grey market goods are substantially impacting authorized U.S.
distribution channels. The lost sales are significant, both in terms of
lost revenue and the ability to develop markets. In many situations,
intellectual property owners develop international licensing pro-
grams with different royalty bases, recognizing that the value of the
licensing right depends on the market in which licensed goods are to
be sold. To permit the flow of goods from an area in which their cost
is relatively low to an area where their cost is relatively high dilutes
the value of the intellectual property rights in the latter market area
and deprives the licensee and the licensor from receiving the benefit
of their bargain. To emphasize that the U.S. consumer is benefitted
by the lower prices sometimes charged by grey market distributors is
to ignore that these distributors are profiting from the development
of product markets by and at the expense of trademark and copyright
owners. The Senate Report on the Lanham Act stated:
Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to
the producer the benefit of good reputation which excellence cre-
ates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public
from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business
community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by preventing
their diversion from those who have created them to those who have
not. 144
As the courts make it more difficult for authorized U.S. distribu-
tors to prevail in grey market trademark cases, serious thought
should be given by those distributors to section 602 of the Copyright
Act. Section 602 is a powerful tool to deter parallel importation, and
13) Id. § 405(a)(2).
140 Id. § 504(b).
141 Id. § 502.
142 Id. § 504(c)(1).
143 Id. § 601.
144 S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1275.
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can be used by firms with nontraditional copyright works. This sec-
tion should not be overlooked by those firms affected by the grey
market.14 5
145 Since this article was accepted for publication, two major decisions relating to it
have been rendered. First, the district court decision in Coalition was reversed, causing a
split in the circuit courts as to the validity of Customs' regulations affecting the grey mar-
ket. Compare Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 790
F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986) with Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
In addition, another decision determining that the first sale doctrine has no applica-
tion to cases involving unauthorized importation in copyright cases has been issued. See
Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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